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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20040633-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW 
Under review is State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291 {Addendum A). In 
addition to the facts and argument contained in the Brief of Petitioner [Pet. Br.], the State 
submits the following in reply to defendant's Brief of Respondent [Resp. Br.]. 
REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
CONTRARYTO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS, PRIOR TO VALDEZ, 
UTAH FOLLOWED THE UNIVERSAL RULE THAT A BATSON 
OBJECTION MUST BE RAISED DURING THE JURY SELECTION 
PROCESS 
Defendant does not dispute that he is required to timely raise a Batson obj ection.' See 
Resp. Br. at 12. He claims, however, that his Batson objection was timely because it was 
raised "following jury selection," but before the trial evidence was presented. See Resp. Br. 
1Batson v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the 
exercise of peremptory strikes). "Batson" is used generically and includes allegations of 
gender-discrimination raised pursuant to J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
at 6 & 16. See also Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, Iflf 7-11 (holding that Utah rule permits a 
Batson objection up until the trial evidence is presented, even if the jury has been sworn and 
the remainder of the venire dismissed). Defendant's characterization of his objection 
minimizes its actual circumstances. 
Defendant did not merely raise his Batson objection "following jury selection." 
During jury selection, defense counsel "noticed . . . that the State struck all women," but he 
did not object when the peremptory strikes were made, the selected jurors were sworn, or the 
stricken jurors and remainder of the venire were excused (R209: 70 & 78). He remained 
silent when the trial jurors were instructed and excused for lunch (R209: 70-76). Only after 
discussing jury instructions and other matters, did defense counsel finally raise his Batson 
objection as the court was ready to recess for lunch (R209: 70 & 76-78). The prosecutor 
immediately responded that the objection was untimely: "We've seated the jury, sworn the 
jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that point" (R209: 78). See Pet Br. 
at 3-5. 
The timing of defendant's Batson objection is significant. Until Valdez, 2004 UT 
App 214, ^  7-11, no jurisdiction—including Utah—viewed a Batson objection as timely if 
raised after the trial jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was excused. See Salt 
Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653,655-56 (Utah App. 1989) and cases citedinPet Br. 
at 11-21. 
Nevertheless, Valdez held and defendant now claims that rule 18, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, "as interpreted by" State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), 
2 
permits a Batson objection to be raised after jury selection is completed and the venire is 
excused so long as no trial evidence has been presented.2 See Resp. Br. at 13-21. See also 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, Tflf 9-11. Defendant concedes, however, that but for Valdez, 
Harrison is the only case to apply rule 18 to a Batson objection. See Resp. Br. at 14. 
Despite this dearth of authority, defendant contends that "[i]n Utah, the firmly-established 
and regularly-followed rule for determining the timeliness of a Batson objection is rule 18." 
Resp. Br. at 13. 
Defendant over reads Harrison. In Harrison, the court of appeals, sua sponte and 
without the benefit of briefing, summarily held that rule 18's good cause provision permitted 
consideration of a Batson objection raised after the jury was sworn, but before the venire was 
dismissed.3 See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. See also Pet. Br. at 19-20. 
By relying exclusively on Harrison's "interpretation" of rule 18, Valdez and 
defendant minimize other substantial authority which aligns with the requirement that 
2Rule 18(c)(2) reads: 
A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn 
to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made 
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. 
See Pet. Br. at 19-20 for discussion of rule 18fs inapplicability to a Batson objection. 
3Defendant claims two other Utah cases considered Batson objections "raised until 
after [the] jury [was] sworn." See Resp. Br. at 14 (citing State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 
363, 58 P.2d 867, and State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 41 P.2d 1153). This is 
incorrect. In Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, \ 3, the Batson objection was made during 
"the exercise of peremptory challenges," but the merits were addressed after the "normal 
process of jury selection was completed." Similarly, in Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 3, 
the Batson objection was raised "during the jury selection." 
3 
objections to the composition of the jury must be raised before jury selection is completed. 
See Resp. Br. at 14-15. Indeed, contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah Court of Appeals 
directly addressed the appropriate time limit for a Batson objection in Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, two years prior to Harrison. Carlston recognized that courts universally require 
a Batson objection to be raised prior to the jury being sworn and the venire excused. 776 
P.2dat655-56. See also Gov't of Virgin Islandsv. Forte, 806 F.2d 73,75-76 (3rd Cir. 1986) 
(holding a Batson obj ection untimely that was raised after the jury selection process); United 
States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656,667 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding a Batson objection untimely that 
was raised before the jury was sworn, but after the venire was released); Gavin v. State, 891 
So.2d 907, 948 (Ala. App. 2003) (citing line of Alabama cases which require a Batson 
objection to be raised before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed); Mooney v. State, 
105 P.3d 149,152-53 (Alaska App. 2005) (discussing the "overwhelming majority" rule that 
a Batson objection must be raised before to the jury is sworn and venire dismissed and 
adopting the same rule in Alaska); Barrow v. State, 605 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Ga. App. 2004) 
(concluding that a Batson objection is untimely if raised "after the jury has been impaneled 
and sworn"); Casiano v. Greenway Enterprises, Inc., Al P.3d 432, 436 (Mont. 2002) 
(affirming that to be timely, a Batson objection must be raised "prior to the impanelment of 
the jury and the dismissal of the venire"); State v. Jones, 581 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Wis. App. 
1998) (holding that "a defendant must make & Batson objection prior to the time the jury is 
sworn" or the claim is waived). After approving of the sound policy supporting this 
4 
universal requirement, Carlston applied the rule to bar consideration of a post- verdict Bats on 
objection.4 776 P.2d at 655-56. 
Carlston also cited to the 1987 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (West 2004), 
as another example of a provision which requires an objection to the jury to be "lodged 
before the jury [is] sworn."5 776 P.2d at 656 n.5. The State likewise cited section 78-46-16 
as consistent with the requirement that aBatson objection be raised during the jury selection 
process, but cautioned that "[s]ection 78-46-16 does not govern constitutionally-based 
challenges, such as Batson." Pet. Br. at 18 (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,574 n. 115 
(Utah 1987)). Nevertheless, defendant erroneously states "the State claims that [section] 78-
46-16(1), rather than rule 18, is controlling." Resp. Br. at 18 (citing Pet. Br. at 18). 
Defendant similarly asserts that "the State concedes that the court of appeals was 
bound to follow Utah's 'procedural practice' when deciding the timeliness of Valdez's 
objection[, but] complains . . . that no other jurisdictions allow Batson objections 'after the 
trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused.'" Resp. Br. at 17. This implies 
that the State admits rule 18 controls a Batson objection, but "complains" the rule should 
not be applied here. Again, this is not the State's position. Rule 18 does not apply to Batson 
objections. See Pet. Br. at 19-20. 
4The State incorrectly stated in its opening brief that Harrison did not 
acknowledge Carlston. See Pet. Br. at 20. It minimally did. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 
776. 
5See Pet. Br., Add. Cfor copy of 2004 statute, which is substantively unchanged 
from the 1987 version.. 
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Defendant claims that "other jurisdictions can and do allow Batson objections after 
the jury is sworn" and cites Lewis v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E,.2d 492 (Va. App. 1997). See 
Resp. Br. at 17. Defendant represents that Lewis held that a Virginia rule "'allows a Batson 
motion to be made after the jury is sworn, but only with leave of the court.'" Id. (quoting 
Lewis, 492 S.E.2d at 493). While the quote is technically correct, defendant ignores Lewis' 
actual holding. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that even though a Virginia rule 
permitted a Batson objection to be raised after the jury was sworn, sound policy required that 
the objection also be made prior to the venire being excused. Lewis, 492 S.E.2d. at 748-751. 
The court explained that if & Batson objection was permitted after the venire was dismissed 
and a violation subsequently found, mistrial would be the only available remedy. Id. at 751. 
Use of this drastic remedy was contrary to Batson's expectation that a wrongfully struck 
juror would be reinstated and also contrary to "the public policy Batson seeks to advance 
[and] the fair administration of justice." Id. at 751-52. Consequently, the court refused to 
consider the merits of the Batson objection, raised after the jury was sworn and after the 
venire was excused. Id. at 747 & 752. 
Lewis is consistent with the universal recognition that there is "simply no 
justification" for raising a Batson objection after the jury is sworn and venire is dismissed: 
If defense counsel does wait until the venire panel is discharged and the 
challenge is sustained, then the jury selection process must start anew, and an 
additional venire panel must be called. This simply delays justice, and, in 
those jurisdictions where an additional venire is not readily available, the delay 
can be substantial. 
6 
State v. Ford, 39 P.3d 1085 112 (Mont. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See 
also cases, supra, at 4 and cases cited in Pet Br. at 14-15. 
Finally, defendant argues that if rule 18's good cause time allowance does not apply 
to a Batson objection, the imposition of any other time limit would constitute a "new rule" 
which could not bar review in this case. See Resp. Br. at 15 & 17 (citing Ford v. Georgia, 
498 U.S. 411 (1991)). The court of appeals agreed with defendant: 
[0]nly "firmly established and regularly followed state [procedure] may be 
interposed by a State to prevent subsequent [appellate] review" of this 
important constitutional claim. 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 7 (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24) (brackets in original). 
However, as discussed in Pet. Br.} Point I, requiring a Batson objection to be raised 
during jury selection is not a "new" rule. In any event, Valdez misinterprets Ford. The 
actual quote in Ford reads: 
[The United States Supreme Court] held that only a firmly established and 
regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent 
subsequent review by this Court of a federal constitutional issue. 
Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Pursuant 
to Ford, a federal court cannot review the merits of a federal constitutional issue when the 
underlying state court refused to consider the merits based on an independent state rule which 
was firmly established and regularly applied by the state court at the time of the defendant's 
trial. See Brewer v. Marshal, 119F.3d993,1001-03 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining independent 
grounds rule in context of Batson claim); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 427-29 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (same). 
7 
The independent grounds rule, however, has no application to a state appellate court's 
review of a state conviction. Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 15 & 17, this 
Court regularly applies "new" procedural rules to the case on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 53,992 P.2d 951 (recognizing that "[t]he long-standing traditional 
rule is that the law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and 
retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law"); State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393,398-400 (Utah 1994) (overturning precedent and applying a new preservation rule 
to Menzies on appeal). Moreover, Batson itself was retroactive. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 316 & 326-27 (1987) (holding that Batson or any case imposing a "new rule 
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions . . . is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state 
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the 
new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past"). 
REPLY TO POINTS II-IV OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS, THE ANALYSIS IN 
VALDEZIS FLAWED AND ITS RESULT IS ERRONEOUS 
As explained in the State's opening brief, see Pet. Br. at 25-39, Batson analysis has 
three steps. In step one, the opponent of a peremptory strike (defendant) makes a prima facie 
showing that the challenged strike was exercised with a discriminatory intent. In step two, 
the proponent of the strike (the prosecutor) provides a non-discriminatory explanation for 
the strike. In step three, the trial court resolves the issue by determining if defendant has 
established that the strike was discriminatory. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. 
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This three step approach "facilitate^) the orderly consideration of relevant evidence" 
through "a series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are intended progressively to sharpen 
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Watson v. Forth 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). See also Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2418 n.7 (2005) (Addendum B). 
The scheme's shifting burdens of production are u;meant only to aid courts and litigants in 
arranging the presentation of evidence;" they do not shift the burden of persuasion which 
"remains at all times'" with the party alleging discrimination. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986 
(quoting Texas Dept. ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450U.S. 248,253 (1981)). Accord 
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417. 
The State previously argued that "Batson's three step analytical procedure is identical 
to that found in employment discrimination cases." Pet Br. at 25 & 26-39. In June 2005, 
the United States Supreme Court again confirmed that its Batson's analysis "comports with 
our interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Actof 1964." Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418n.7 (citing 5t Mary's Honor Center 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993); Watson, 487 U.S. at 986; Furnco Constr. Corp v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-
04 (1973)). A comparison of Batson and Title VII cases over the last three decades confirms 
their common analytical foundation. See, e.g.y Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 n.7 (comparing 
peremptory strike analysis with Title VII standard of McDonnell Douglas)', Purkett v. Elm, 
514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (applying Title VII analysis of St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 
9 
U.S. at 502, and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-58, to peremptory strikes); Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 & 364 (1991) (same citing United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983)); Batson, A16 U.S. at 85,89 & 94-98 (same citing 
Aikens, Burdine, and McDonnell Douglas). See also St Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. 
at 506-11 & 515-19 (applying Aikins and McDonnell to evaluation of Title VII claim), 
Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87 (same citing Aikins, Burdine, McDonnell Douglas), Aikens, 
460 U.S. at 714-16 (same citing Burdine and McDonnell Douglas); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
252-56 (same citing McDonnell Douglas). 
These authorities are uniform in their interpretation of step two of the discrimination 
model, the step at issue in this case. Step two is purely a matter of production. See Johnson, 
125 S.Ct at 2417. Accord St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506-08 (citing Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 254-55). The prosecutor has the burden of producing an explanation for his 
strike beyond a mere denial of discriminatory intent or assertion of good faith. See Purkett, 
514 U.S. at 769. But while the burden of production shifts from defendant in step one to the 
prosecutor in step two, there is no shift in the burden of persuasion or "risk of 
nonpersuasion," which remains at all times with defendant as the opponent of the strike. See 
St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507 (in context of Title VII) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). Accord Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18. Consequently, whether the 
prosecutor has met his burden in step two "'can involve no credibility assessment.'" 
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 n.7 (citing S£ Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509-10 & n.3 
10 
(quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 986)). If a facially neutral explanation is produced, the inquiry 
proceeds to step three. See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18 & n.7. 
Defendant disagrees. He argues that in Batson cases, step two is not necessarily 
satisfied by the production of a facially non-discriminatory explanation. SeeResp. Br. at 27-
31. Citing court of appeals' decisions, defendant argues that the prosecutor's explanation 
also must be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, 
and (4) legitimate." Resp. Br. at 31 (citing Valdez, 2004 UT App 214,121, and Cannon, 
2002 UT App 18, Tf 9) (quotation marks omitted). Defendant contends that these factors are 
not alternative descriptions of the otherwise facially valid explanation, but constitute separate 
and mandatory requirements. See Resp. Br. at 31-32. See also Valdez, id. Valdez held and 
defendant argues that without the imposition of these additional mandatory factors, even 
"fanciful and spurious explanations" would satisfy step two and compel the trial court to 
unnecessarily proceed with its step three analysis even though the "State had offered nothing 
concrete by way of explanation." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^  30 (emphasis in original). 
See also Resp. Br. at 29-31. 
The Valdez approach contradicts established United States Supreme Court precedent. 
See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-70. See also Pet. Br. at 31-34. Just last month, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that: 
Thus, even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical 
justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely proceeds to step 
three. 
11 
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18 (citations omitted). Thus, contrary to Valdez's holding, 
fanciful and spurious explanations do satisfy step two, so long as those explanations are 
facially neutral. 
The Valdez holding miscomprehends the function of step two. Step one (the prima 
facie showing) establishes facts, which if believed, could support a finding of discriminatory 
intent. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506-07. Step two, on the other hand, 
establishes a basis, which if believed, could support a finding of no discriminatory intent. 
See id. at 507. As explained in Johnson, the trial court can address the merits of defendant's 
challenge only after these two steps: 
The first two Batson steps govern the production of evidence that allows the 
trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant's constitutional 
claim. "It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification 
becomes relevant—the step in which the trial court determines whether the 
opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination." 
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). By requiring both parties to 
state their positions, the trial court's inquiry in step three become focused with sufficient 
specificity to permit a ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 & n.8. 
Because the prosecutor, as the proponent of the strike, carries no burden of persuasion 
and no "risk of nonpersuasion," the quality and believability of the explanation are irrelevant 
in step two. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507. In step three, however, they 
may provide persuasive "circumstantial evidence" that Ihe strike was or was not 
discriminatory. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). 
12 
Consequently, even if a prosecutor supplies only a spurious explanation in step two, the 
Batson inquiry does not end, but proceeds to step three. See Johnson, 125 S .Ct. at 2417-18. 
Indeed, a prosecutor's utter failure to meet step two's burden of production does not negate 
the necessity of proceeding to step three: 
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a 
trial judge's inquiry regarding his justification for making a strike, the 
evidence before the judge would consist not only of the original facts from 
which the prima facie case was established, but also the prosecutor's refusal 
to justify his strike in light of the court's request. Such a refusal would 
provided additional support for the inference of discrimination raised by a 
defendant's prima facie case. 
M a t 2417 n.6. 
In this case, the prosecutor was not silent, but provided explanations for each of the 
challenged strikes. See Pet, Br, at 32-39. Valdez acknowledged that "anyone would concede 
[these explanations were] nondiscriminatory," but nevertheless concluded that they were 
pretextual as a "matter of law" because they were not "reasonably clear and specific" and in 
some instances, "were unrelated to the case at hand."6 2004 UT App 214, \ 28. 
6
 Valdez specifically adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review for steps 
one and two, based on this Court's adoption of the same standard in State v. Alvarez, 872 
P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). See 2004 UT App 214, Tffl 14-17. However, Valdez applied a 
question of law standard in concluding the explanations were pretextual. See id. at \ 29. 
In addition to the cases cited in Pet. Br, at 34 n.5, the following cases support that steps 
one and two are questions of law. See Stevenson v. Tax Comm., 2005 UT App 179, ^ f 11, 
112, P.3d 1232 (reviewing prima facie case as a matter of law); State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 
454, 459 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 454 (Utah 1993) (same); Hidalgo v. Fagen, 
206 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing step two as a matter of law); United 
States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (same). 
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In reaching this conclusion, Valdez looked beyond the face of the explanations and 
considered "the context of the case," which the court viewed as "indispensable" to step two 
analysis. See 2004 UT App 214, \ 17. The court compared the prosecutor's explanations 
with the voir dire responses of the stricken jurors and other members of the venire. See id 
at ffif 26-28. It also compared the prosecutor's explanations to the issues of the case. See id. 
Based on these comparisons—and not the facial validity of the explanations themselves—the 
court rejected the prosecutor's explanations and ended its Batson inquiry. See id at ^  29-30. 
While defendant endorses this approach, see Resp. Br. at 27-37, the United States Supreme 
Court has rejected it. See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69. 
Defendant also argues that even if the court of appeals erred in its step two assessment 
and improperly commingled step three's criteria with step two, the error is harmless. See 
Resp. Br. at 3 7-45. According to defendant, any court reviewing the matter would reject the 
prosecutor's explanations as pretextual and deny the strikes. See id. If proper Batson 
standards were applied, this is not true.7 
A trial court's finding regarding discriminatory intent (step three) is entitled to great 
deference on appeal; only a finding of clear error justifies its reversal. See State v. Colwell, 
2000 UT 8, % 20,994 P.2d 177. Though defendant disputes the validity of the explanations, 
7Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 45, in petitioning for certiorari, 
the State raised this issue by arguing that the court of appeals erred in substituting its 
assessment of credibility for that of the trial court. See Petition at 9-14 and Reply 
Petition at 5. See also Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) (recognizing that all fairly included 
subissues fall within a grant of certiorari review). 
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see Resp. Br. at 33-45, he does not allege or establish that the trial court clearly erred in 
finding no discriminatory intent. 
Instead, defendant presumes that if the prosecutor's explanations are rejected, a 
finding of discriminatory intent necessarily follows. See Resp. Br. at 43-44. The Supreme 
Court rejected an identical argument in the context of a Title VII claim: 
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant 
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will 
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination 
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, 
no additional proof of discrimination is required But the Court of Appeals' 
holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment 
for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle . . . that a presumption 
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that 
the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. 
St Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511 (citing Aikens and Bur dine) (other citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Here, defendant has not met his burden of persuasion. As discussed in the State's 
opening brief, once the prosecutor provides his explanations , defendant was obligated to 
challenge any he claimed were pretextual. See Pet. Br. at 30. Here, defendant remained 
silent (R209: 79-80). Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 21-22, defendant's 
silence can and should be considered in evaluating whether he has carried his burden of 
15 
persuasion.8 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citing Sfc Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at SOT-
OS). 
Moreover, defendant's analysis of the jurors is skewed. He argues that the 
prosecutor's reasons for striking the four women jurors applied to other jurors as well. See 
Resp. Br. at 33-45. While this is a factor which may be considered, it is not the only factor 
in determining the ultimate question of discriminatory intent. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
363. 
Moreover, the prosecutor was only asked to explain why he struck a particular juror. 
He was not asked—nor was there any reason for him to explain given defendant's silence— 
why he retained other jurors, who arguendo may have had similar characteristics with those 
struck. For example, five members of the venire had relatives in law enforcement (R209:30-
31, 38-42). In contrast, none of the jurors struck by the prosecutor did (R206:14-16,18-19, 
23-24,27-28, 34-35, 49-50). One member of the venire had a relative victimized by abuse 
(R206:44). None ofthe jurors stricken by the prosecutor were (R206: 14-16, 18-19,23-24, 
27-28, 34-35, 49-50). Five venire members volunteered in voir dire that they had military 
or other firearm experience (R209: 25-27, 29-31, 38). None ofthe jurors struck by the 
prosecutor volunteered that they had similar experience (R206:14-16,18-19,23-24,27-28, 
34-35,49-50). 
8Defendant claims this issue is not within the scope ofthe certiorari grant. See 
Resp. Br. at 21-23. However, the State argued in its petition that all portions ofthe 
Valdez analysis were flawed. See Petition at 12-13. See also Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). 
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Similarly, defendant ignores the pattern of the strikes. The prosecutor, however, did 
not strike the first four women on the roster. See Addendum C (R. 94: Jury List). Instead, 
he skipped over three women on the jury list before striking Valareio (id.). He also skipped 
over four women before striking Gonzales (id.). In the next round, the prosecutor skipped 
over two women before striking Thornton (id.). And in the final round, he skipped over four 
women before striking Morley (id.). 
These record facts may fairly be considered in determining whether defendant carried 
his burden of persuasion to establish discrimination. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. 
In sum, when proper Batson standards are applied, the trial court's finding of no 
discriminatory intent is entitled to affirmance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this^? day of July, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Anthony James VALDEZ, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20030089-CA. 
June 24, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
Department, Judith S. Atherton, J., of aggravated 
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, and criminal mischief. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,: 
held that: 
(1) defendant's alleged failure to timely present 
Batson challenge did not prevent district court from 
addressing challenge or result in waiver; 
(2) defendant's objections to state's use of 
peremptory challenges preserved Batson claim for 
appeal, although he did not challenge validity of 
prosecutor's explanations; 
(3) Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's 
determination for abuse of discretion; and 
(4) prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory 
challenges to strike only women. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Jury <®^ > 117 
230kll7 
Defendant's alleged failure to timely present Batson 
challenge by failing to raise it until after the venire 
had been dismissed, the jury had been sworn in, and 
the court preliminarily instructed the jury did not 
prevent district court from addressing challenge or 
result in waiver; rather, court impliedly found good 
cause to allow challenge to state's peremptory 
strikes beyond usual limits by ignoring state's 
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to 
proceed directly to arguments on the merits. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 18(c)(2). 
[2] Jury <§==> 117 
230kll7 
Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory strike 
must be timely. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[3] Criminal Law <®^1028 
110kl028 
Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion 
are deemed waived, precluding the appellate court 
from considering their merits on appeal. 
[4] Criminal Law <£^ > 1035(5) 
110kl035(5) 
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson 
depends entirely upon local procedures, but only 
firmly established and regularly followed state 
procedure may be interposed by a State to prevent 
subsequent appellate review of the important 
constitutional claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[5] Jury <®^ > 117 
230kll7 
A district court may consider a defendant's Batson 
challenge beyond the dismissal of the venire, even if 
it has made no specific finding of good cause; so 
long as it allows counsel to proceed with their 
Batson arguments, the district court impliedly finds 
good cause to consider the constitutional claim. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 18(c)(2). 
[6] Criminal Law <@^> 1035(5) 
110kl035(5) 
Court of Appeals could not prevent appellate review 
of defendant's Batson claim due to lack of timeliness 
even if court agreed that Batson challenges were 
prohibited after the venire has been dismissed and 
the jury has been sworn, as proposed rule was not 
firmly established and regularly followed state 
procedure. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2). 
[7] Criminal Law <2^ > 1035(5) 
110kl035(5) 
Defendant's objections to state's use of peremptory 
challenges preserved Batson claim for appeal, 
although he did not challenge the validity of the 
prosecutor's explanations for the strikes. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[8] Criminal Law <®=>1030(1) 
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110kl030(l) 
To ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an 
issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah 
requires that a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record. 
[9] Criminal Law <®^=> 1043(1) 
110kl043(l) 
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring a defendant 
to renew a Batson objection or to object specifically 
to the state's offered explanations; rather, Utah 
courts do not require a party to continue to object 
once a motion has been made, and the trial court has 
rendered a decision on the issue. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
[10] Criminal Law <®=* 1152(2) 
HOkl 152(2) 
Court of Appeals considered defendant's Batson 
challenge one of discretion with the trial court and 
reviewed trial court's determination for abuse of that 
discretion; issue of whether the prosecutor offered a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for peremptory 
strikes was less like a factual issue, because the trial 
court did not weigh evidence, but instead looked to 




The first step of the tripartite process for 
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in 
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection 
process requires that a defendant challenging the 
prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge present a 
prima facie case of discrimination. 
[12] Criminal Law <S^ > 1152(2) 
HOkl 152(2) 
A trial court's determination that a defendant has 
presented a prima facie case of discrimination in 
jury selection is a matter of some discretion on the 
part of the trial court, and will only be reversed if 
the trial court has abused its discretion. 
[13] Criminal Law <s^ => 1152(2) 
HOkl 152(2) 
The Court of Appeals allows the trial court 
discretion in making the determination whether, in 
the context of the specific case, a defendant has 




The third step of the tripartite process for 
determining whether the prosecution engaged in 
prohibited discrimination during the jury selection 
process requires the trial court to weigh the evidence 
and look beyond the explanation, if possible, to 
determine whether the strike was purposefully 
discriminatory. 
[15] Criminal Law <@^> 1158(3) 
llOkl158(3) 
The trial court's actions in weighing the evidence 
and looking beyond the explanation for a 
peremptory strike during jury selection to determine 
whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory 




Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a three-step 
test to determine whether the prosecutor has 
engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury 
selection process; this test equally applies in cases of 
gender discrimination. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[17] Jury<®=»33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Under the second step of the three-step test to 
determine whether, pursuant to Batson, the 
prosecutor has engaged in prohibited discrimination 
during the jury selection process, even suspect 
explanations must be deemed facially valid unless 
they are inherently discriminatory. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[18] Jury <®=>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Although the Batson challenge step requiring the 
prosecutor to give an explanation following a prima 
facie case of discrimination does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible, it 
does require the proponent of the peremptory 
challenge to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for the challenge. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[19] Jury <®=>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
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Under Bats on, the reason for a peremptory strike 




Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike 




Under Bat son, a prosecutor is required to articulate 
a neutral explanation related to the particular case, 
giving a clear, concise and reasonably specific 
legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors; 
there must also be support in the record for such an 
explanation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[22]Jury<£=>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory 
challenges to strike only women; state did not 
provide any basis for explanations that some jurors 
were "overly compassionate" or "matter of fact," 
state cited vague nondiscriminatory motives without 
tying motives to jurors themselves, and some of 
state's explanations were unrelated to case at hand. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[23]Jury<©^33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
In order to survive a Bats on challenge, it is not 
enough for the prosecutor simply to describe a 
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to 
something specific about the juror herself. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[24]Jury®^33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a reason for 
striking a juror, courts considering a Batson 
challenge should apply particularly careful scrutiny, 
because such after-the-fact rationalizations are 
susceptible to abuse. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[25] Jury<8^=>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Unless the neutral explanation offered by the state 
for a peremptory strike may, on its face, be tied to 
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand, 
the explanation will not be considered legitimate; 
rather, the court reviewing a Batson challenge will 
consider the explanation mere pretext as a matter of 
law, unrelated as it is to the reality of the 
proceedings before the district court. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
*294 John D. O'Connell Jr. and Lori Seppi, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Christine Soltis, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 




**1 Anthony James Valdez appeals convictions for 
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-203 
(2002); possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-
503(2)(a) (2002); and criminal mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-6-106 (2002). We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Valdez was prosecuted for various domestic 
violence charges, including the violent crimes listed 
above. On October 29, 2002, the district court 
conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's 
trial. Following the jury selection, Valdez objected 
to the State's use of its peremptory challenges under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In order to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Batson, 
Valdez's counsel noted that the State used all four of 
its peremptory challenges to exclude women from 
the jury. Valdez further noted that in a domestic 
violence jury trial, gender issues tend to be highly 
charged. Ultimately, he argued, the State's 
exclusion of only women from the jury cannot be 
disregarded, on its face, in the context of this case. 
**3 The State did not argue that Valdez had failed 
to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but 
instead argued Valdez's Batson challenge was 
untimely. Without addressing the timeliness of 
Valdez's challenge, the district court ordered the 
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State to explain its challenges. The State explained 
its challenges as follows: 
[T]he State chose to strike Ms. Valerio because 
she stated that she worked for a nonprofit brain 
injury type of place. That is not a basis upon 
which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her 
responses lined up in a way that would make her 
not a helpful [juror] for the State and that she 
would be somewhat overly compassionate. 
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez. She had 
heard of the case and seemed- though she said 
that it wouldn't bother her, her responses to me 
seemed matter of fact and I felt like her responses 
would not make her a good juror for the State. 
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I 
don't recall what it was, there was something that 
I immediately decided that I would make her one 
of my strikes. She'd also been on a jury and he 
was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I 
thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least 
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like she was 
not going to be a helpful one for the State. 
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, 
No. 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I 
conferred with my colleague, ... *295 and we 
talked about it and she brought to my attention he 
was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would 
know things about guns and brought that point 
about that potential juror and another one. And 
after conferring with her I changed my mind and 
went with [her]—and that was simply—she was 
simply towards the end. I suppose there was also 
it felt like she was not strong, not—I'm sorry, I'm 
trying to read my notes here.... 
There was this pattern of—her responses made me 
think she would be somebody, again, that might be 
willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would 
say overly compassionate, and it was just based on 
her responses about position, her responses to 
little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons 
and the magazines she chose. We don't have a lot 
to base these things on, so that's how I made those 
choices. 
(First alteration in original.) Ultimately, the 
district court accepted the State's explanations and 
overruled Valdez's objection. 
**4 During the jury trial, the victim recanted her 
accusation against Valdez. The State called an 
expert in Battered Women Syndrom (BWS) to 
explain why many victims of abuse recant their 
accusation against their abuser. Valdez objected to 
the testimony, but the district court overruled the 
objection. The jury found Valdez guilty of 
aggravated burglary, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, and criminal 
mischief. Valdez appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
**5 Valdez challenges the district court's ruling 
that the State offered nondiscriminatory reasons for 
its use of peremptory strikes. 
I. Procedural Issues 
**6 As a preliminary matter, the State raises two 
threshold procedural issues that, according to the 
State, bar appellate review of Valdez's challenges. 
A. Timeliness 
[1][2][3][4] **7 First, the State contends Valdez 
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely 
manner. Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory 
strike must be timely. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 99- 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724-25, 90 
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (allowing for local timeliness 
rules to bar Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 
(stating, in context of Batson challenge, "[i]t is 
axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue 
on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was 
timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon"). "Issues not 
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed 
waived, precluding this court from considering their 
merits on appeal." Carlston, 116 P.2d at 655. 
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson 
depends entirely upon local procedures, see id.; 
Fordv. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850, 
857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly 
established and regularly followed state [procedure]' 
may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent 
[appellate] review" of this important constitutional 
claim. Id. at 423-24, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (citation 
omitted). 
**8 Valdez waited to raise his Batson challenge 
until after the venire had been dismissed, the jury 
had been sworn in, and the court preliminarily 
instructed the jury. The State refers us to several 
other jurisdictions that require a Batson challenge to 
be raised no later than "in the period between the 
selection of the jurors and the administration of their 
oaths." Id. at 422, 111 S.Ct. at 857; see also 
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Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56 (citing favorably, in 
dicta, several jurisdictions that require Batson 
challenge to be raised prior to dismissing venire). 
The reason for barring a Batson challenge after the 
jury is sworn in has been variously stated as 
follows: 
The "timely objection" rule is designed to prevent 
defendants from "sandbagging" the prosecution by 
waiting until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily 
before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes 
that by then the prosecutor may largely have 
forgotten. Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct 
is easily remedied prior to commencement of trial 
simply by seating the wrongfully struck 
venireperson. After trial, the only remedy is 
setting aside the conviction. 
*296 Id. at 656 (citations omitted); see also 
People v. Holder, 153 Ill.App.3d 884, 106 111.Dec. 
700, 506 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiver 
rule enforced "so as not to allow a defendant to 
object to that which he has acquiesced in" 
throughout trial). 
**9 Furthermore, the State argues, this rule is 
consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18(c)(2), which provides "[a] challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn ... except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but 
before any of the evidence is presented." In State v. 
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied rule 18's 
good cause provision to review an untimely Batson 
challenge. See 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah 1991). 
However, in that case the challenge was "made and 
argued immediately after the jury was sworn in, 
before the challenged jurors were excused from 
service, and before opening statements of counsel." 
Id. This is significant, the State maintains, because 
once the venire and the challenged jurors have been 
dismissed, the remedy of reinstating the wrongly 
challenged juror is no longer available. Thus, under 
the State's argument, Harrison represents the 
"outside limit" in Utah to timely raising a Batson 
challenge. 
[5] **10 However, under Harrison, a district court 
may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond 
the dismissal of the venire, even if it has made no 
specific finding of good cause pursuant to rule 18 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 805 
P.2d at 776. So long as it "allow[s] counsel to 
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the district 
court impliedly finds good cause under rule 18 to 
consider the constitutional claim. Id. In this case, 
the district court did just that by ignoring the State's 
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to 
proceed directly to arguments on the merits. Thus, 
the district court impliedly found good cause under 
rule 18 to allow a challenge to the State's 
peremptory strikes beyond the usual limits. 
[6] **11 However, even if we adopted the State's 
position, we could not "interpose[ ]" it "to prevent 
subsequent [appellate] review" in this case. Ford, 
498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. at 857. The rule the 
State proposes, which would prohibit Batson 
challenges after the venire has been dismissed and 
the jury has been sworn, has not heretofore been a " 
'firmly established and regularly followed state 
[procedure].' " Id. at 423, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (1991) 
(citations omitted). At best, this rule could be 
gleaned by analogy and implication from Harrison 
and rule 18. However, rule 18 itself allows Batson 
challenges at a later time than the State's proposed 
rule, because it allows challenges "before any of the 
evidence is presented." Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(2). 
Thus, in the absence of any firmer and more 
established authority on the subject, we could not 
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional 
claim due to lack of timeliness. [FN1] 
FN1. This issue would best be addressed by an 
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. This opinion should not be read as a 
comment, positive or negative, on the 
appropriateness of the rule the State proposes. 
B. Preservation 
[7][8] **12 Second, the State argues Valdez failed 
to preserve his objection to the State's explanation 
for the strikes. Specifically, Valdez did not 
challenge the validity of the prosecutor's 
explanations for the strikes. Consequently, the State 
argues, Valdez is precluded from attacking the 
State's explanations for the first time on appeal. 
"[T]o ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider 
an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah 
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record.' " State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). 
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[9] **13 We are persuaded by Valdez, however, 
that his initial objection to the State's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike women from the 
jury constituted sufficient preservation of his 
constitutional claim. Ford v. Georgia held that an 
appellate court cannot prevent review by applying a 
"rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial." 
*297 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 858, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). In Utah, there is no clear rule 
requiring a defendant to renew a Batson objection or 
to object specifically to the State's offered 
explanations. Rather, Utah courts do "not require a 
party to continue to object once a motion has been 
made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on 
the issue." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,H 14, 20 
P.3d 265. Here, Valdez objected to the State's use 
of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any 
claim that he strategically hid his objection until 
after obtaining an unsatisfactory result, which seems 
to be the State's strongest objection to Valdez's 
challenge. 
II. Issue and Standard of Review 
[10] **14 Valdez specifically challenges the 
district court's ruling that the State offered a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its use of peremptory 
strikes. We are unaware of any cases properly 
applying an appropriate standard of review for such 
challenges. State v. Chatwin appears to set forth a 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for such 
challenges. See 2002 UT App 363,H 5, 58 P.3d 867 
"Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated 
reason for striking the potential juror was not neutral 
and constituted illegal discrimination.... Absent a 
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial 
court's determination concerning the discriminatory 
intent embodied in a party's explanation for the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge." Id. To 
establish the clearly erroneous standard of review in 
the step two context, however, Chatwin cited, 
without analysis, State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 
U 5, 41 P.3d 1153. That case set forth the clearly 
erroneous standard of review in the step three 
context, and is inapplicable here. Chatwin went 
further, however, and decided the step two question 
as a matter of law, rather than applying the clearly 
erroneous standard it previously set forth. Here, 
our decision will analyze and clarify the appropriate 
standard of review for step two challenges. 
Accordingly, we must determine the appropriate 
standard of review, relying on analogy to other 
standards of review applicable in cases involving 
alleged discrimination in the voir dire process. 
[11][12][13] **15 The challenge at issue involves 
the second step of a tripartite process for 
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in 
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection 
process. See Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at 1f 7, 58 
P.3d 867. The first step of that test requires that a 
defendant challenging the prosecutor's use of a 
peremptory challenge must present a prima facie 
case of discrimination. See id. A trial court's 
determination that a defendant has presented a prima 
facie case of discrimination is a matter of some 
discretion on the part of the trial court, and we will 
only reverse that determination where the trial court 
has abused its discretion. See State v. Alvarez, 872 
P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). The purpose for 
allowing the trial court some discretion in 
determining whether the defendant has presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination was stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
The abuse of discretion standard of review is 
particularly appropriate to this question.... [T]he 
United States Supreme Court was reluctant to 
define in detail what facts will raise an inference 
of discrimination. Likewise, we have not 
articulated specific factors that amount to a "strong 
likelihood" that minority jurors were challenged 
because of their racial or ethnic group 
membership. By according discretion to the trial 
court in this area, we permit "experience to 
accumulate at the lowest court level" until we "see 
more clearly what factors are important to [the] 
decision and how to take them into account." 
See id. at 456 n. 3 (citations omitted). What may 
constitute a prima facie showing of discrimination in 
the context of one case may not constitute a showing 
of discrimination in the context of another case. 
This is so because each case may turn on different 
issues, or even subtly different nuances. Thus, we 
allow the trial court discretion in making the 
determination whether, in the context of the specific 
case, a defendant has presented a prima facie case of 
discrimination. 
[14][15] **16 The third step of the tripartite 
process for determining whether the *298 
prosecution engaged in prohibited discrimination 
during the jury selection process requires the trial 
court to weigh the evidence and "look beyond the 
explanation, if possible, to determine whether the 
strike was purposefully discriminatory." Chatwin, 
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2002 UT App 363 at H 7, 58 P.3d 867. More than 
being dependant on the particular issues, 
circumstances and nuances of a particular case, this 
determination requires the trial court to delve into a 
weighing of the evidence and the credibility of the 
prosecutor. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 
(1991). This is an intensely factual determination, 
see State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,U 13, 41 P.3d 
1153, and we thus review the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error. See State v. Jensen, 2003 
UT App 273,K 7, 76P.3dl88. 
**17 In our view, the issue involved here, whether 
the prosecutor offered a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory strikes, 
is closely analogous to the step one issue. It seems 
less like a factual issue because the trial court does 
not weigh evidence, but instead looks to the face of 
the State's explanations. See Chatwin, 2002 UT 
App 363 at K 7, 58 P.3d 867 (stating prosecutor's 
explanation "must be, at the very least, facially 
neutral" (emphasis added)). The trial court's 
examination of the facial neutrality of the State's 
explanation also considers the general context of the 
case and the specific issues involved, see id. (stating 
prosecutor's explanation "must be ... related to the 
case being tried"), similar to the way the trial court 
considers whether the defendant has presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination. See Alvarez, 872 
P.2d at 455-56. Indeed, the district court's 
consideration of the context of the case is an 
indispensable portion of the step two analytic 
framework, as we will discuss below. Thus, steps 
one and two in the analytical process appear to be 
analytic reciprocals. Accordingly, it is appropriate 
to consider this issue one of discretion with the trial 
court and to review the trial court's determination 
for abuse of that discretion. [FN2] 
FN2. Because Valdez's step two challenge 
constitutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not 
reach his alternate step three argument. Further, 
we do not reach Valdez's arguments regarding the 
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome 
evidence within the context of this case. See State 
v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998) 
(holding where one argument is dispositive of the 
appeal, we need not address the defendant's 
remaining arguments). 
III. Batson and its Progeny 
**18 Valdez claims the State engaged in 
impermissible gender discrimination during the 
selection of the jury. In Batson v. Kentucky, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution governs the use of 
peremptory challenges by prosecutors in criminal 
trials. See 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has 
"no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in 
part of persons of his own race,' " id. at 85, 106 
S.Ct. at 1717 (citation omitted), a "defendant does 
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members 
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria." 
Id. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. In J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 
L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme 
Court extended the holding of Batson to protect 
litigants from gender discrimination in the jury 
selection process: "We have recognized that ... 
litigants ... have an equal protection right to jury 
selection procedures that are free from state-
sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and 
reflective of, historical prejudice.... We hold that 
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for 
juror competence and impartiality." Id. at 128-29, 
114 S.Ct. at 1421. 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the 
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory 
selection of the jury will infect the entire 
proceedings.... 
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges 
in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and 
reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities 
of men and women. Because these stereotypes 
have wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of 
our country's public life, active discrimination by 
litigants on the basis of gender during jury 
selection "invites cynicism *299 respecting the 
jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the 
law." The potential for cynicism is particularly 
acute in cases where gender-related issues are 
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual 
harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges may create the impression 
that the judicial system has acquiesced in 
suppressing full participation by one gender or that 
the "deck has been stacked" in favor of one side. 
Id. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427 (citations omitted). 
[16] **19 Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a 
three-step test to determine whether the prosecutor 
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has engaged in prohibited discrimination during the 
jury selection process. See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step test to 
question of racial discrimination). This test equally 
applies in cases of gender discrimination. See State 
v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,^ 13, 76 P.3d 188 
(applying three-step test to question of gender 
discrimination). We have stated the test as follows: 
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge 
has made out a prima facie case of [gender] 
discrimination (step 1), the burden of production 
shifts to the proponent of the strike to come 
forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation (step 
2). If a [gender]-neutral explanation is tendered, 
the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether 
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful 
[gender] discrimination." 
Id. at K 13 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,f 
17, 994 P.2d 177 (other citation omitted)) 
(alterations in original). 
**20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it waived 
the issue of whether Valdez presented a prima facie 
case of discrimination. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at j^ 
18, 994 P.2d 177 (stating prosecution must 
challenge sufficiency of prima facie case before 
providing rebuttal explanation for strike, or issue is 
waived). Thus, we examine only step two of the 
analysis. 
[17][18] **21 Under this step, even "suspect" 
explanations must be deemed "facially valid" unless 
they are "inherently discriminatory." State v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,1) 10, 41 P.3d 1153; see 
also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 
111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) 
("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed [gender] neutral."). Although this step 
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, 
or even plausible," Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 
767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 
(1995), it does " require[ ] the proponent of the 
peremptory challenge, the prosecutor in this case, to 
come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation 
for the challenge." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 atH 17, 994 
P.2d 177. Utah courts have enumerated a number 
of factors that must be considered within the context 
of the case at hand to determine whether the 
prosecution has offered a legitimate explanation: 
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the 
prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation for the challenge." This step "does 
not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or 
even plausible." So long as the reasons given are 
" '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, 
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate,' " " 'the reason[s] offered will be 
deemed race neutral.' " 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at K 9, 41 P.3d 1153 
(citations omitted). 
**22 The courts have been instructive in defining 
and applying each of these factors. For example, in 
Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., the Tenth Circuit was asked 
to decide whether a defendant's explanation for a 
peremptory strike was facially neutral. See 206 
F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2000). In that case, the 
defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the venire, 
explaining that it was because of her youth. See id. 
The court, looking specifically at the facial validity 
of the defendant's explanation, concluded the strike 
was neutral, holding: "A neutral explanation means 
an explanation based on something besides the race 
of the juror.... Unless discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the justification, the reason offered will 
be deemed race neutral." Id. at 1019. Such a 
rationale is similarly applied to show gender 
neutrality. 
*300 **23 The "legitimate" factor is closely 
related to the "neutral" factor. As this court has 
noted, the Supreme Court has provided guidance in 
determining whether the reason for a peremptory 
strike is legitimate: " 'a "legitimate reason" is not a 
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 
deny equal protection.' " State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
For example, in Merrill, the defendant claimed that 
the reason the prosecutor gave for his peremptory 
challenge was not legitimate. See id. The 
prosecutor had dismissed a potential juror who was 
Asian. See id. at 402. The reason for the dismissal, 
the prosecutor explained, was because he feared the 
potential juror would be biased against law 
enforcement due to a recent speeding ticket. See id. 
We concluded that was a legitimate explanation 
because it "does not deny a potential juror equal 
protection." Id. at404. 
[19] **24 The reason for a peremptory strike must 
also be related to the case being tried. In State v. 
Cantu, a prosecutor's reason for a peremptory strike 
of a Hispanic potential juror was invalidated in part 
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because it was unrelated to the juror or the case. 
See 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989). . The 
prosecutor's proffered reason for the strike was 
because he was angry with defense counsel. See id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that this explanation 
was desultory, and thus insufficient to fulfill the 
Batson requirement that peremptory strikes must be 
based upon grounds reasonably related to the case at 
bar. See id. 
[20][21] **25 Finally, the reason for a peremptory 
strike must be clear and reasonably specific. This 
factor prevents a prosecutor from merely denying 
the existence of a discriminatory motive or by 
generally proclaiming good faith, ensuring that 
equal protection will not become a "vain and 
illusory requirement." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 
(1986). Rather, it requires the prosecutor "to 
articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case, giving a clear, concise and 
reasonably specific legitimate explanation for 
excusing those jurors." New Mexico v. Aragon, 109 
N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (1989). There must 
also be support in the record for such an 
explanation. See State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 
547 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). For example, in Aragon, 
the prosecutor struck two prospective jurors who 
were black because they were possibly related to the 
defendant. See 784 P.2d at 17. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court noted that nothing in the record 
showed the prosecutor had any basis for his opinion 
that the potential jurors might be untrustworthy, 
other than his own statement of their possible blood 
relationship. See id. As a result, the court ruled 
that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation was hardly 'a 
clear, concise, and reasonably specific explanation 
for excusing those jurors.' " Id. at 21 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the court reversed the trial 
court. See id. 
IV. Valdez's Batson Challenge 
[22] [23] **26 With that analytical framework in 
mind, we approach Valdez's step two challenge. 
Valdez's argument that the State's peremptory 
challenges violated equal protection is persuasive. 
Specifically, Valdez argues that the State's reason 
for using peremptory challenges to strike only 
women was not reasonably clear or specific. As in 
Aragon, there is little in the record to demonstrate 
that the State had any basis for its strikes of these 
four women. For example, as Valdez aptly notes, 
the State explains that Jurors Morely and Valerio 
were "overly compassionate" and Gonzalez was 
"matter of fact" without providing any clear basis 
for its opinions other than these cursory 
descriptions. Further, the prosecutor stated 
variously "I felt her responses lined up in a way that 
would make her not a helpful witness for the 
State.... [H]er responses to me seemed matter of 
fact and I felt like her responses would not make her 
a good juror for the State.... I don't recall what it 
was [about Ms. Thornton], there was something that 
I immediately decided that I would make her one of 
my strikes." These explanations all fall short of 
being reasonably clear and specific. It is not enough 
for the prosecutor simply to describe a 
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to 
something specific about the juror herself. See 
United States v. *301 Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 
(11th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation 
that he struck juror because "I just got a feeling 
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being 
reasonably clear and specific). 
[24] **27 If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a 
reason for striking a juror, courts should apply 
"particularly careful scrutiny" because "such after-
the-fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse." 
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir.1992). 
Although not required, prosecutors "would be well 
advised ... to make contemporaneous notes as to the 
specific behavior on the prospective juror's part that 
renders such person unsuitable for service on a 
particular case." Id. In this case, however, the State 
was hardly clear, concise, or reasonably specific in 
its explanations. It offered nothing more than vague 
and generic descriptions of the jurors that anyone 
would concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do 
not appear to have anything to do with the jurors 
themselves. This is not sufficient to satisfy our 
equal protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient in 
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of the 
State's peremptory strike. 
**28 In addition to not being reasonably clear and 
specific, some of the State's explanations were 
unrelated to the case at hand. For example, the 
State struck Thornton because she had been on a 
jury that had found a defendant, who had been 
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter. As 
Valdez correctly notes, other than being a criminal 
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with the 
present case. Valdez was not charged with 
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manslaughter or any other lesser-included offenses. 
Furthermore, Thornton's participation on a jury that 
convicted another defendant of manslaughter does 
not undermine her ability to be impartial in the 
present case. 
[25] **29 The State argues in its brief that these 
explanations were not inherently discriminatory 
because nothing in the explanations themselves 
pointed directly to the sorts of invidious stereotypes 
the law condemns. While this may be true, the test 
for determining the legitimacy and facial neutrality 
of an explanation in the Batson context is the list of 
factors outlined in Cannon, see 2002 UT App 18,If 
9, 41 P.3d 1153, and analyzed above. Unless the 
neutral explanation offered by the State may, on its 
face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and context of 
the case at hand, the explanation will not be 
considered legitimate. Rather, we will consider the 
explanation mere pretext as a matter of law, 
unrelated as it is to the reality of the proceedings 
before the district court. 
**30 Were we to hold otherwise, we would 
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious 
explanations for even the most sinister 
discriminatory motives. Without the requirement 
that the explanation at least have, on its face, a 
grounding in the context of the case itself, racist or 
sexist motives could more easily be masked by 
unrelated but inherently nondiscriminatory 
explanations. In such a case, the district court 
would have no need to proceed to step three to 
plumb the depths of the prosecutor's motivations 
because the State had offered nothing concrete by 
way of explanation. See State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT 
App 363,f 20, 58 P.3d 867 (holding State did not 
offer legitimate step two explanation, obviating the 
need to proceed to step three). This is just such a 
case. The prosecutor's explanations had no clear 
and specific basis in the case at hand. Thus, we 
hold it was an abuse of the district court's discretion 
to determine the explanations were 
nondiscriminatory and to proceed to step three. 
CONCLUSION 
**31 The State's peremptory strikes should have 
been invalidated by the trial court because the State 
failed to offer facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
explanations. The explanations were neither clear 
and specific nor related to the case being tried. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
**32 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Judge. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
125 S.Ct. 2410 
125 S.Ct. 2410, 73 USLW 4460, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5024, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6903, 
2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6906, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 368 
(Cite as: 125 S.Ct. 2410) 
H 
Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of the United States 




Argued April 18, 2005. 
Decided June 13, 2005. 
Background: Following a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted in the Superior Court, Contra Costa 
County, Patricia K. Sepulveda, J., of second-degree 
murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child, 
resulting in death. Defendant appealed. The Court 
of Appeal, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, reversed and 
remanded. The California Supreme Court, 71 P.3d 
270, Chin, J., granted the Attorney General's 
petition for review and reversed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal. Petition for writ of certiorari was 
granted. 
Holding: The United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Stevens, held that permissible inferences of 
discrimination were sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Batson, shifting 
the burden to the state to explain adequately the 
racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral 
justifications for the strikes. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Breyer concurred and filed opinion. 
Justice Thomas dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Jury <@^>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
State's requirement that in order to establish a prima 
facie case under Bats on an objector must show that 
it was "more likely than not" that the other party's 
peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based 
on impermissible group bias was an inappropriate 
yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a 
prima facie case of discrimination injury selection. 
[2] Jury<®=>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
For purposes of evaluating peremptory strikes under 
Bats on, first, the defendant must make out a prima 
facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose, second, once the defendant has made out a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to 
explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering 
permissible race-
neutral justifications for the strikes, and, third, if a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court 
must then decide whether the opponent of the strike 
has proved purposeful racial discrimination. 
[3] Jury<©^>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Inferences of discrimination stemming from 
prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges to 
strike all three African-Americans from jury panel 
in murder prosecution of African-American 
defendant charged with murdering his white 
girlfriend's child, which caused the trial judge to 
comment that the case was close and the state 
Supreme Court to acknowledge that it was 
suspicious that all three African-American 
prospective jurors were removed, were sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under 
Bats on, shifting the burden to the State to explain 
adequately the racial exclusion by offering 
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 
[4]Jury<§^>33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on 
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of 
peremptory challenges at defendant's trial: first, the 
defendant must show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire members of the defendant's race; second, the 
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which 
there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 
constitute a jury selection practice that permits those 
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate; 
finally, the defendant must show that these facts and 
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference 
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their 
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A defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson" s 
first step of making a prima facie case of 
discrimination, thereby shifting the burden to the 
state to explain adequately the racial exclusion by 
offering permissible race-neutral justifications for 
the strikes, by producing evidence sufficient to 
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred. 
[6] Jury<S^33(5.15) 
230k33(5.15) 
Under Batson analysis, in the unlikely hypothetical 
in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a trial 
judge's inquiry regarding his justification for making 
a strike, the evidence before the judge to be 
considered in making the 
decision whether the defendant has proven 
purposeful racial discrimination would consist not 
only of the original facts from which the prima facie 
case was established, but also the prosecutor's 
refusal to justify his strike in light of the court's 
request. 
*2A12 Syllabus [FN*] 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter 
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
Petitioner Johnson, a black man, was convicted in a 
California state court of assaulting and murdering a 
white child. During jury selection, a number of 
prospective jurors were removed for cause until 43 
eligible jurors remained, three of whom were black. 
The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory 
challenges to remove the prospective black jurors, 
resulting in an all-white jury. Defense counsel 
objected to those strikes on the ground that they 
were unconstitutionally based on race. The trial 
judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain his 
strikes, but instead simply found that petitioner had 
failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination under the governing state precedent, 
People v. Wheeler, which required a showing of a 
strong likelihood that the exercise of peremptory 
challenges was based on group bias. The judge 
explained that, although the case was close, his 
review of the record convinced him that the 
prosecutor's strikes could be justified by race-
neutral reasons. The California Court of Appeal set 
aside the conviction, but the State Supreme Court 
reinstated it, stressing that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, permits 
state courts to establish the standards used to 
evaluate the sufficiency of prima facie cases of 
purposeful discrimination in jury selection. 
Reviewing Batson, Wheeler, and their progeny, the 
court concluded that Wheeler's "strong likelihood" 
standard is entirely consistent with Batson. Under 
Batson, the court held, a state court may require the 
objector to present not merely enough evidence to 
permit an inference that discrimination has occurred, 
but sufficiently strong evidence to establish that the 
challenges, if not explained, were more likely than 
not based on race. Applying that standard, the court 
acknowledged that the exclusion of all three black 
prospective jurors looked suspicious, but deferred to 
the trial judge's ruling. 
Held: California's "more likely than not" standard 
is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure 
the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination in jury selection. This narrow but 
important issue concerns the scope of the first of 
three steps Batson enumerated: (1) Once the 
defendant has made out a prima facie case and (2) 
the State has satisfied its burden to offer permissible 
race-neutral justifications for the strikes, e.g., 476 
U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712, then (3) the trial court 
must decide whether the defendant has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination, Purkett v. Elem, 
514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L,Ed.2d 834. 
Batson does not permit California to require at step 
one that the objector show that it is more likely than 
not the other party's peremptory challenges, if 
unexplained, were based on impermissible group 
bias. The Batson Court held that a prima facie case 
can be made out by offering a wide variety of 
evidence, so long as the sum of the *2413 proffered 
facts gives "rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose." 476 U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The 
Court explained that to establish a prima facie case, 
the defendant must show that his membership in a 
cognizable racial group, the prosecutor's exercise of 
peremptory challenges to remove members of that 
group, the indisputable fact that such challenges 
permit those inclined to discriminate to do so, and 
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference 
that the prosecutor excluded venire members on 
account of race. Id., at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
125 S.Ct. 2410 
(Cite as: 125 S.Ct. 2410, *2413) 
Court assumed that the trial judge would have the 
benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the 
prosecutor's explanation, before deciding whether it 
was more likely than not that the peremptory 
challenge was improperly motivated. The Court did 
not intend the first step to be so onerous that a 
defendant would have to persuade the judge-on the 
basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible 
for the defendant to know with certainty-that the 
challenge was more likely than not the product of 
purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant 
satisfies Batson's first step requirements by 
producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial 
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 
occurred. The facts of this case illustrate that 
California's standard is at odds with the prima facie 
inquiry mandated by Batson. The permissible 
inferences of discrimination, which caused the trial 
judge to comment that the case was close and the 
California Supreme Court to acknowledge that it 
was suspicious that all three black prospective jurors 
were removed, were sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case. Pp. 2418-2419. 
Reversed and remanded. 
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, 
SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and 
BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
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Seth K. Schalit, San Francisco, CA, for 
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Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
[1] The Supreme Court of California and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have 
provided conflicting answers to the following 
question: "Whether to establish a prima facie case 
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the objector must 
show that it is more likely than not that the other 
party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were 
based on impermissible group bias?" Pet. for Cert, 
i. Because both of those courts regularly review the 
validity of convictions obtained in California 
criminal trials, respondent, the State of California, 
agreed to petitioner's request that we grant certiorari 
and resolve the conflict. We agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that the question presented *2414 must be 
answered in the negative, and accordingly reverse 
the judgment of the California Supreme Court. 
I 
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was 
convicted in a California trial court of second-degree 
murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child, 
resulting in death. During jury selection, a number 
of prospective jurors were removed for cause until 
43 eligible jurors remained, 3 of whom were black. 
The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory 
challenges to remove the black prospective jurors. 
The resulting jury, including alternates, was all 
white. 
After the prosecutor exercised the second of his 
three peremptory challenges against the prospective 
black jurors, defense counsel objected on the ground 
that the challenge was unconstitutionally based on 
race under both the California and United States 
Constitutions. People v. Johnson, 30 Cal.4th 1302, 
1307, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, 272-273 (2003) 
. [FN1] Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor 
"had no apparent reason to challenge this 
prospective juror 'other than [her] racial identity.' " 
Ibid, (alteration in original). The trial judge did not 
ask the prosecutor to explain the rationale for his 
strikes. Instead, the judge simply found that 
petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case 
under the governing state precedent, People v. 
Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 
P.2d 748 (1978), reasoning " 'that there's not been 
shown a strong likelihood that the exercise of the 
peremptory challenges were based upon a group 
rather than an individual basis,' " 30 Cal.4th, at 
1307, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272 (emphasis 
added). The judge did, however, warn the 
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prosecutor that " 'we are very close.' " People v. 
Johnson, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 729 (2001). 
FN1. Petitioner's state objection was made under 
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 
890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). 
Defense counsel made an additional motion the next 
day when the prosecutor struck the final remaining 
prospective black juror. 30 Cal.4th, at 1307, 1 
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272. Counsel argued 
that the prosecutor's decision to challenge all of the 
prospective black jurors constituted a "systematic 
attempt to exclude African-Americans from the jury 
panel." 105 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 729. The trial judge 
still did not seek an explanation from the prosecutor. 
Instead, he explained that his own examination of 
the record had convinced him that the prosecutor's 
strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons. 
Specifically, the judge opined that the black venire 
members had offered equivocal or confused answers 
in their written questionnaires. 30 Cal.4th, at 
1307-1308, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272-273. 
Despite the fact that " 'the Court would not grant 
the challenges for cause, there were answers ... at 
least on the questionnaires themselves [such] that the 
Court felt that there was sufficient basis' " for the 
strikes. Id., at 1308, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 
273 (brackets added). Therefore, even considering 
that all of the prospective black jurors had been 
stricken from the pool, the judge determined that 
petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case. 
The California Court of Appeal set aside the 
conviction. People v. Johnson, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 
727 (2001). Over the dissent of one judge, the 
majority ruled that the trial judge had erred by 
requiring petitioner to establish a "strong likelihood" 
that the peremptory strikes had been impermissibly 
*2415 based on race. Instead, the trial judge should 
have only required petitioner to proffer enough 
evidence to support an "inference" of 
discrimination. [FN2] The Court of Appeal's 
holding relied on decisions of this Court, prior 
California case law, and the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190 (2000). Applying 
the proper "reasonable inference" standard, the 
majority concluded that petitioner had produced 
sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case. 
FN2. In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the notion that a showing of a " 'strong 
likelihood' " is equivalent to a " 'reasonable 
inference.' " To conclude so would "be as novel a 
proposition as the idea that 'clear and convincing 
evidence' has always meant a 'preponderance of 
the evidence.' " 105 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 733. 
Respondent appealed, and the California Supreme 
Court reinstated petitioner's conviction over the 
dissent of two justices. The court stressed that 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), left to state courts the task of 
establishing the standards used to evaluate the 
sufficiency of defendants' prima facie cases. 30 
Cal.4th, at 1314, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 277. 
The court then reviewed Batson, Wheeler, and those 
decisions' progeny, and concluded that "Wheeler's 
terms 'strong likelihood' and 'reasonable inference' 
state the same standard "-one that is entirely 
consistent with Batson. 30 Cal.4th, at 1313, 1 
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 277. A prima facie case 
under Batson establishes a " 'legally mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption,' " it does not merely 
constitute "enough evidence to permit the inference" 
that discriminalion has occurred. 30 Cal.4th, at 
1315, 1 Cal.Rp1r.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 278. Batson, the 
court held, "permits a court to require the objector 
to present, not merely 'some evidence' permitting 
the inference, but 'strong evidence' that makes 
discriminatory intent more likely than not if the 
challenges are not explained." 30 Cal.4th, at 1316, 
1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 278. The court opined 
that while this burden is "not onerous," it remains 
"substantial." Ibid., 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 
279. 
Applying that standard, the court acknowledged 
that the case involved the "highly relevant" 
circumstance that a black defendant was "charged 
with killing 'his White girlfriend's child,' " and that 
"it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-
American prospective jurors were removed from the 
jury." Id., at 1326, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 
286. Yet petitioner's Batson showing, the court 
held, consisted "primarily of the statistical disparity 
of peremptory challenges between African-
Americans and others." 30 Cal.4th, at 1327, 1 
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 287. Although those 
statistics were indeed "troubling and, as the trial 
court stated, the question was close," id., at 1328, 1 
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 287, the court decided to 
defer to the trial judge's "carefully considered 
ruling." Ibid. [FN3] We granted certiorari, but 
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dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because 
the judgment *2416 was not yet final. Johnson v. 
California, 541 U.S. 428, 124 S.Ct. 1833, 158 
L.Ed.2d 696 (2004) (per curiam). After the 
California Court of Appeal decided the remaining 
issues, we again granted certiorari. 543 U.S. — , 
125 S.Ct. 824, 160 L.Ed.2d 610 (2005). 
FN3. In dissent, Justice Kennard argued that 
" [requiring a defendant to persuade the trial court 
of the prosecutor's discriminatory purpose at the 
first Wheeler-Batson stage short-circuits the 
process, and provides inadequate protection for the 
defendant's right to a fair trial ... ." 30 Cal.4th, at 
1333, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 291. The 
proper standard for measuring a prima facie case 
under Batson is whether the defendant has 
identified actions by the prosecutor that, "if 
unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of an 
improper purpose or motive." 30 Cal.4th, at 
1339, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 294. Trial 
judges, Justice Kennard argued, should not 
speculate when it is not "apparent that the [neutral] 
explanation was the true reason for the challenge." 
Id., at 1340, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 295. 
II 
[2] The issue in this case is narrow but important. 
It concerns the scope of the first of three steps this 
Court enumerated in Batson, which together guide 
trial courts' constitutional review of peremptory 
strikes. Those three Batson steps should by now be 
familiar. First, the defendant must make out a 
prima facie case "by showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S., at 93-94, 106 
S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 
(1976)). [FN4] Second, once the defendant has 
made out a prima facie case, the "burden shifts to 
the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion" 
by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for 
the strikes. 476 U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see 
also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 
S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). Third, "[i]f a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court 
must then decide ... whether the opponent of the 
strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination." 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 
1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). 
FN4. An "inference" is generally understood to be 
a "conclusion reached by considering other facts 
and deducing a logical consequence from them." 
Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed.1999). 
[3] The question before us is whether Batson 
permits California to require at step one that "the 
objector must show that it is more likely than not the 
other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, 
were based on impermissible group bias." 30 
Cal.4th, at 1318, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 280. 
Although we recognize that States do have flexibility 
in formulating appropriate procedures to comply 
with Batson, we conclude that California's "more 
likely than not" standard is an inappropriate 
yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a 
prima facie case. 
[4] We begin with Batson itself, which on its own 
terms provides no support for California's rule. 
There, we held that a prima facie case of 
discrimination can be made out by offering a wide 
variety of evidence, [FN5] so long as the sum of the 
proffered facts gives "rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S., at 94, 106 
S.Ct. 1712. We explained that 
FN5. In Batson, we spoke of the methods by 
which prima facie cases could be proved in 
permissive terms. A defendant may satisfy his 
prima facie burden, we said, "by relying solely on 
the facts concerning [the selection of the venire] in 
his case." 476 U.S., at 95, 106 S.Ct. 1712 
(emphasis in original). We declined to require 
proof of a pattern or practice because " ' [a] single 
invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not 
'immunized by the absence of such discrimination 
in the making of other comparable decisions.' " 
Ibid, (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 
n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)). 
"a defendant may establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit 
jury solely on evidence concerning the 
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at 
the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the 
defendant first must show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor 
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove 
from the venire members of the defendant's race. 
Second, the defendant is *2417 entitled to rely on 
the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that 
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection 
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who 
are of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the 
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defendant must show that these facts and any other 
relevant circumstances raise an mference that the 
prosecutor used that practice to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their 
race " Id, at 96, 106 S Ct 1712 (citations 
omitted) (quoting Avery v Georgia, 345 U S 559, 
562, 73 SCt 891, 97 L Ed 1244(1953)) 
Indeed, Batson held that because the petitioner had 
timely objected to the prosecutor's decision to strike 
"all black persons on the venire," the trial court was 
m error when it "flatly rejected the objection without 
requirmg the prosecutor to give an explanation for 
his action " 476 U S , at 100, 106 S Ct 1712 We 
did not hold that the petitioner had proved 
discrimination Rather, we remanded the case for 
further proceedmgs because the trial court failed to 
demand an explanation from the prosecutor--* e , to 
proceed to Batson's second step-despite the fact that 
the petitioner's evidence supported an inference of 
discrimination Ibid 
[5] Thus, in descnbmg the burden- shifting 
framework, we assumed m Batson that the trial 
judge would have the benefit of all relevant 
circumstances, including the prosecutor's 
explanation, before deciding whether it was more 
likely than not that the challenge was improperly 
motivated We did not intend the first step to be so 
onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the 
judge-on the basis of all the facts, some of which 
are impossible for the defendant to know with 
certamty-that the challenge was more likely than 
not the product of purposeful discrimination 
Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient 
to permit the trial judge to draw an mference that 
discrimination has occurred 
Respondent, however, focuses on Batson's ultimate 
sentence "If the trial court decides that the facts 
establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and 
the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral 
explanation for his action, our precedents require 
that petitioner's conviction be reversed " Ibid For 
this to be true, respondent contends, a Batson claim 
must prove the ultimate facts by a preponderance of 
the evidence in the prima facie case, otherwise, the 
argument goes, a prosecutor's failure to respond to a 
prima facie case would inexplicably entitle a 
defendant to judgment as a matter of law on the 
basis of nothing more than an inference that 
discrimination may have occurred Brief for 
Respondent 13 18 
[6] Respondent's argument is misguided Batson, 
of course, explicitly stated that the defendant 
ultimately carries the "burden of persuasion" to " 
'prove the existence of purposeful discrimination ' " 
476 U S , at 93, 106 S Ct 1712 (quotmg Whitus v 
Georgia, 385 U S 545, 550, 87 SCt 643, 17 
L Ed 2d 599 (1967)) This burden of persuasion 
"rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of 
the strike " Purkett, 514 U S , at 768, 115 S Ct 
1769 Thus, even if the State produces only a 
frivolous or utierly nonsensical justification for its 
strike, the case does not end-it merely proceeds to 
step three Ibid [FN6] The first two Batson steps 
govern the production of *2418 evidence that allows 
the trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the 
defendant's constitutional claim "It is not until the 
third step that the persuasiveness of the justification 
becomes relevant-the step in which the trial court 
determines whether the opponent of the strike has 
carried his burden of provmg purposeful 
discrimination ' Purkett, supra, at 768, 115 S Ct 
1769 [FN7] 
FN6 In the unlikely hypothetical in which the 
prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge's 
inquiry regarding his justification for making a 
strike, the evidence before the judge would consist 
not only of the original facts from which the prima 
facie ca<e was established, but also the 
prosecutor s refusal to justify his strike in light of 
the court'< request Such a refusal would provide 
additional support for the inference of 
discrimination raised by a defendant s prima facie 
case Cf United States ex rel Vajtauer v 
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 US 103, 111, 
47 S Ct 302, 71 L Ed 560 (1927) 
FN7 This explanation comports with our 
interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in 
cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 See, e g , Furnco Constr Corp v 
Waters, 438 U S 567, 577, 98 S Ct 2943, 57 
L Ed 2d 957 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell 
Douglas Corp v Green, 411 U S 792, 93 S Ct 
1817, 36 LEd2d 668 (1973), framework "is 
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the 
evidence m light of common experience as it bears 
on the critical question of discrimination"), see 
also St Mary s Honor Center v Hicks 509 U S 
502, 509 510, and n 3, 113 SCt 2742, 125 
L Ed 2d 407 (1993) (holding that determinations at 
steps one and two of the McDonnell Douglas 
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framework "can involve no credibility assessment" 
because "the burden-of-production determination 
necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment 
stage," and that the burden-shifting framework 
triggered by a defendant's prima face case is 
essentially just "a means of 'arranging the 
presentation of evidence' ") (quoting Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986, 108 
S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988)). 
Batson's purposes further support our conclusion. 
The constitutional interests Batson sought to 
vindicate are not limited to the rights possessed by 
the defendant on trial, see 476 U.S., at 87, 106 
S.Ct. 1712, nor to those citizens who desire to 
participate "in the administration of the law, as 
jurors," Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). Undoubtedly, the 
overriding interest in eradicating discrimination 
from our civic institutions suffers whenever an 
individual is excluded from making a significant 
contribution to governance on account of his race. 
Yet the "harm from discriminatory jury selection 
extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and 
the excluded juror to touch the entire community. 
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black 
persons from juries undermine public confidence in 
the fairness of our system of justice." Batson, 476 
U.S., at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Smith v. 
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 
84 (1940) ("For racial discrimination to result in the 
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified 
groups not only violates our Constitution and the 
laws enacted under it but it is at war with our basic 
concepts of a democratic society and a 
representative government" (footnote omitted)). 
The Batson framework is designed to produce 
actual answers to suspicions and inferences that 
discrimination may have infected the jury selection 
process. See 476 U.S., at 97-98, and n. 20, 106 
S.Ct. 1712. The inherent uncertainty present in 
inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against 
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when 
a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple 
question. See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 
1090 (C.A.9 2004) ("[I]t does not matter that the 
prosecutor might have had good reasons ... [w]hat 
matters is the real reason they were stricken" 
(emphasis deleted)); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 
707, 725 (C.A.3 2004) (speculation "does not aid 
our inquiry into the reasons the prosecutor actually 
harbored" for a peremptory strike). The three-step 
process thus simultaneously serves the public 
purposes Batson is designed to vindicate and 
encourages "prompt rulings on objections to 
peremptory challenges without substantial disruption 
of the jury selection process." *2419 Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 
114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (opinion of KENNEDY, 
J.). 
The disagreements among the state-court judges 
who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the 
imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to 
resolve plausible claims of discrimination. In this 
case the inference of discrimination was sufficient to 
invoke a comment by the trial judge "that 'we are 
very close,' " and on review, the California 
Supreme acknowledged that "it certainly looks 
suspicious that all three African-American 
prospective jurors were removed from the jury." 30 
Cal.4th, at 1307, 1326, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 
273, 286. Those inferences that discrimination may 
have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case under Batson. 
The facts of this case well illustrate that 
California's "more likely than not" standard is at 
odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by 
Batson. The judgment of the California Supreme 
Court is therefore reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered 
Justice BREYER, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion while maintaining here 
the views I set forth in my concurring opinion in 
Miller-El v. Dretke, ante,— U.S. — , 125 S.Ct. 
2317, — L.Ed.2d — , 2005 WL 1383365 (2005). 
Justice THOMAS, dissenting. 
The Court says that States "have flexibility in 
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with 
Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)]," ante, at 2416, but it then 
tells California how to comply with "the prima facie 
inquiry mandated by Batson," ante, at 2419. In 
Batson itself, this Court disclaimed any intent to 
instruct state courts on how to implement its 
holding. 476 U.S., at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("We 
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decline, however, to formulate particular procedures 
to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection 
to a prosecutor's challenges"); id., at 99- 100, n. 
24, 106 S.Ct. 1712. According to Batson, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that prosecutors 
select juries based on factors other than race-not 
that litigants bear particular burdens of proof or 
persuasion. Because Batson's burden-shifting 
approach is "a prophylactic framework" that polices 
racially discriminatory jury selection rather than "an 
independent constitutional command," Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 
L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), States have "wide discretion, 
subject to the minimum requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with 
solutions to difficult problems of policy," Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 
L.Ed.2d 756 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428, 438-439, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 
L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). California's procedure falls 
comfortably within its broad discretion to craft its 
own rules of criminal procedure, and I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
125 S.Ct. 2410, 73 USLW 4460, 05 Cal. Daily Op. 
Serv. 5024, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6903, 2005 
Daily Journal D.A.R. 6906, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. 
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